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For some crimes, conviction requires knowledge of an inculpatory proposition. Federal law, 
for instance, makes it a crime to “knowingly…possess with intent to…distribute…a controlled 
substance.”1 Thus, conviction under this statute requires knowledge2 that what one possessed 
was a controlled substance. Mere recklessness3 toward this fact will not suffice.  
When a defendant is charged with a knowledge crime, it is common practice among courts to 
allow willful ignorance of the inculpatory proposition to satisfy the knowledge element of the 
crime.4 So-called willful ignorance jury instructions state that the jury may find the requisite 
knowledge to be present if the defendant was merely willfully ignorant of the relevant 
proposition.5 Willful ignorance instructions in a drug possession case, for example, might permit 
the jury to find that the defendant had the knowledge required for conviction if he was willfully 
ignorant of the fact that the substance he possessed was a narcotic. As I use the term, “the willful 
ignorance doctrine” refers to the rule that juries may convict a defendant of a crime requiring 
knowledge even if he was only willfully ignorant of the relevant inculpatory proposition.6 																																																								
1 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
2 Under the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), “[a] person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an 
offense” when he is “aware” or “practically certain” that the element obtains (depending on what sort of element it 
is). MPC § 2.02(2)(b). Thus, in the criminal law “knowledge requires both belief, or subjective certainty, and the 
actual truth or existence of the thing known.” Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 TEX. 
L. REV. 1351, 1374-75 (1992). The criminal law notion of knowledge thus is weaker than the philosophical notion 
of true justified belief plus restrictions to avoid Gettier cases. 
3 “A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” MPC § 2.02(2)(c). 
4 All the federal courts of appeals have endorsed some version of the willful ignorance doctrine. See Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 & n.9 (2011) (collecting cases). 
5 United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (discussing such jury instructions). 
6 The doctrine I am concerned with thus should not be confused with the distinct evidentiary rule recognizing that 
evidence tending to show willful ignorance can also constitute evidence from which a jury might infer actual 
knowledge. See, e.g. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2073 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that “[f]acts that support 
willful blindness are often probative of actual knowledge”).  
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But why may a defendant’s willful ignorance be taken to satisfy the knowledge element of 
the crime charged? What justifies this practice? The Supreme Court recently noted that “[t]he 
traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants who behave in [a willfully ignorant] 
manner are just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”7  Following Doug Husak and 
Craig Callender, I call this the equal culpability thesis.8  
Some might question the willful ignorance doctrine on the ground that if the statute the 
defendant is charged with violating requires a given mental state (e.g. knowledge), it is unfair to 
convict him of violating it if he only acted with a different mental state (e.g. willful ignorance).9 
However, I will set aside such doubts here because the issue is not special to the willful 
ignorance context. There are many examples of such “substitution principles” in criminal law.10 
Instead, I mean to investigate a different question: assuming the courts’ “traditional 
rationale” can sometimes justify taking willful ignorance to satisfy the knowledge element of the 
crime charged, under what conditions would this be legitimate? When, that is, would the 
“traditional rationale” underwrite willful ignorance jury instructions? If we are to remain faithful 
to the “traditional rationale,” willful ignorance towards the inculpatory proposition should be 
taken to satisfy the knowledge element of the crime in all but only those cases in which the 
willfully ignorant defendant really is as culpable as a similarly situated actor with knowledge. 
Thus, the proper scope of the willful ignorance doctrine would just be the set of cases in which 
the equal culpability thesis holds. So to determine when willful ignorance instructions are 
																																																								
7 Id. at 2069.   
8 Douglas N. Husak and Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal Culpability” Thesis: A 
Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 53 (1994). 
9 See Husak and Callender, supra note 8 at 58. 
10 For example, negligence can substitute for recklessness “if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware 
of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober.”  MPC § 2.08(2). Similarly, while murder typically 
requires purpose or knowledge with respect to the victim’s death, recklessness can suffice if the circumstances 
manifest “extreme indifference to the value of human life.” MPC § 210.2(1)(b). See generally Paul H. Robinson, 
Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 616–20 (1984) (discussing several mens rea substitution principles).  
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warranted on the “traditional rationale,” we need to know when the equal culpability thesis itself 
is true. Are all cases of willfully ignorant misconduct as culpable as knowing misconduct? Or is 
this true only in some cases of willful ignorance? This is the issue I mean to investigate here. 
Section 1 argues against the broadest version of the equal culpability thesis, which employs 
the most basic understanding of willful ignorance. The reason it is problematic is that sometimes 
one can be willfully ignorant in the basic sense despite being less culpable than one’s similarly 
situated knowing counterpart. Thus, this unrestricted version of the thesis is over-inclusive.  
This suggests that the equal culpability thesis must be restricted to be defensible. In sections 
2-4, I consider several such restrictions that have been proposed by Husak and Callender, David 
Luban,11 Alan Michaels12 and Deborah Hellman.13 These proposals face problems, however. 
Accordingly, I defend a distinct version of the equal culpability thesis. Drawing on, but further 
refining, the account I have defended elsewhere,14 I argue that willful ignorance involves the 
breach of a duty of reasonable investigation, and the equal culpability thesis holds when one 
breaches this duty in a sufficiently serious way before doing the actus reus of the crime. 
The aim of this paper thus is to give a limited defense of the equal culpability thesis. If the 
arguments offered here are sound, the willful ignorance doctrine requires reform. To remain 
faithful to the courts’ “traditional rationale,” willful ignorance instructions should not be given in 
just any case of willful ignorance (as many courts allow15), but only when it is plausible that the 
defendant acted with a form of willful ignorance that rendered her conduct as culpable as the 
																																																								
11 David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L. J. 957 (1999). 
12 Alan Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953 (1998). 
13 Deborah Hellman, Willfully Blind for Good Reason, 3 CRIM. L. & PHILOSOPHY 301 (2009). 
14 Alex Sarch, Willful Ignorance, Culpability and the Criminal Law, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1023 (2014); Alex 
Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97 (2016). 
15 See Heredia, 483 F.3d at 920 (construing the willful ignorance doctrine to require only willful ignorance in what I 
call the “basic” sense); United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Flores, 
454 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Geisen, 612 F.3d 471, 485-86 (6th Cir. 2010) (same); 
United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). 
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analogous knowing misconduct. Thus, identifying a defensible version of the equal culpability 
thesis places constraints on how the willful ignorance doctrine should be applied in practice. 
 
1. Basic Willful Ignorance and the Unrestricted Equal Culpability Thesis 
Evaluating the equal culpability thesis requires clarifying the notions of culpability and 
willful ignorance. In this paper, I work under the assumption that the familiar insufficient regard 
theory of culpability is roughly correct. Its basic thought is that one is culpable for an action to 
the extent that it manifests insufficient regard for the protected interests of others (or perhaps 
more generally, morally relevant considerations). Many philosophers and legal theorists adopt 
such a theory,16 and it is similar in spirit to other well-known accounts of culpability.17 For 
present purposes, we needn’t decide exactly how the details are to be developed. The arguments 
of this paper should go through regardless of how this basic idea is sounds fleshed out, precisely.  
However, it is important to note that I will be mainly concerned with legal culpability, as 
opposed to the possibly distinct notion of moral blameworthiness.18 The former, roughly, is that 																																																								
16 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Culpability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (Deigh, 
and Dolinko, eds.) (2011) (“acts are culpable when they manifest insufficient concern for the interests of others”); 
LARRY ALEXANDER AND KIMBERLY FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 67-68 (2009) (arguing that “insufficient 
concern [is] the essence of culpability”); NOMY ARPALY AND TIM SCHROEDER, IN PRAISE OF DESIRE 170 (“a person 
is blameworthy for a wrong action A to the extent that A manifests ill will (or moral indifference) through being 
rationalized by it”); VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 250 (2005) (“if [a defendant] is convicted of a 
serious offence, the state communicates...that [his] behaviour manifested an inappropriate regard for other citizens 
and their interests”); see generally id. 71-99; Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 
289, 373-74 (“a person is normatively blameworthy for engaging in conduct that a statute prohibits if he was 
motivated by an attitude of disrespect for the interests that the statute seeks to protect”). 
17 The insufficient regard theory is similar in spirit to the theory that an action is culpable to the degree that “it is a 
product of a faulty mode of recognition or response to reasons for action.” GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 38 (2011). 
See also Julia Markowitz, Acting for the Right Reasons, 119 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 201 (2010) (discussing the 
theory that “my action is morally worthy if and only if my motivating reasons for acting coincide with the reasons 
morally justifying the action”); Peter Graham, A Sketch of a Theory of Blameworthiness, 88 PHILOSOPHY AND 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL AFFAIRS 388, 407 (2014) (arguing that one is blameworthy iff the reactive emotions are 
appropriate, and this, in turn, is true iff “in ϕ-ing, X has violated a moral requirement of respect”). 
18 I leave it open whether criminal culpability is same as moral blameworthiness. On my view, defended elsewhere, 
the legal notion of criminal culpability is a simplified, idealized version of the notion of moral blameworthiness. See 
Alex Sarch, Who Cares What You Think? Criminal Culpability and the Irrelevance of Unmanifested Mental States 
(manuscript on file with author). While the moral notion is understood in terms of insufficient regard for morally 
relevant considerations, the legal notion can be understood in terms of insufficient regard for considerations that the 
law either does recognize (if we’re interested in explaining posited law) or should (if we want to critique the law). 
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which makes punishment deserved and that substantive criminal prohibitions aim to track, while 
the latter is what makes one an apt target of the reactive attitudes. (I leave it open exactly how 
the two are related.) Moreover, I only appeal to one sort of legal culpability. Rather than being 
concerned with how much culpability this or that jurisdiction actually attributes for a crime, my 
arguments focus on a normative notion of legal culpability—that is, the amount that jurisdictions 
like ours ideally should attribute. This paper aims to critically evaluate the law to determine the 
proper scope of the willful ignorance doctrine. Accordingly, it won’t do to simply appeal to the 
amount of culpability a jurisdiction actually attributes. These attributions may be quite flawed. 
The aim is to home in on a normatively defensible version of the willful ignorance doctrine, and 
so I argue in part from what I take to be plausible normative claims about how much culpability 
should be attributed. But at the same time, to make sure the notion of culpability is genuinely 
legal, it should also respect the broad, well-settled principles of criminal law in jurisdictions like 
ours. Thus, the concept of legal culpability I appeal to is not merely descriptive; it is a 
normatively cleaned up version of the concept that is at work in jurisdictions like ours. 
Having clarified the normative notion of criminal culpability I’ll be concerned with, let’s 
consider willful ignorance itself. To start, it is widely agreed that willful ignorance is not just a 
sub-species of criminal law knowledge. Knowledge in the criminal law consists in high 
subjective certainty plus truth,19 and the consensus among courts20 and commentators21 is that 
willful ignorance is not knowledge thus understood. If it were, this would vindicate the equal 																																																								
19 See supra note 2. 
20 United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477-78 (2d Cir. 2003) (willful ignorance instruction “permits a finding of 
knowledge even where there is no evidence that the defendant possessed actual knowledge” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2005) (“deliberate indifference charge 
permits ‘the jury to convict without finding that the defendant was aware of the existence of illegal conduct’”); 
Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[w]illful blindness is not knowledge”).  
21 Charlow, supra note 2 at 1390 (“most definitions of wilful ignorance delineate a mens rea that is the equivalent 
neither of knowledge nor recklessness”); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance As A 
Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 226 (1990) (suggesting “that deliberate ignorance is not 
knowledge”); Hellman, supra note 13 at 302 (2009) (“contrived ignorance itself is not a form of knowledge”); 
Husak and Callender, supra, note 8 at 51 (arguing that “wilfully ignorant defendants do not possess knowledge”). 
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culpability thesis, since it would mean any willfully ignorant actor trivially is as culpable as a 
knowing actor.22  But as Husak and Callender show, one can be willfully ignorant of a 
proposition even if one does not have a high degree of subjective confidence in its truth, as 
required for knowledge.23 Perhaps one merely sees its truth as somewhat (not highly) probable, 
but deliberately declines to get more information about it, which suffices for willful ignorance. 
If willful ignorance is not a form of knowledge, what is it? On the most basic understanding, 
willful ignorance involves two components. As Glanville Williams put it, a party is willful 
ignorant if he “has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further 
enquiries.”24 Likewise, the Supreme Court recently observed that most courts agree on “two 
basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability 
that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that 
fact.”25 Given the broad agreement that at least these two prongs are required, I adopt the 
following as the basic account of the legal concept of willful ignorance: 
Basic Willful Ignorance: To be willfully ignorant of an inculpatory proposition p 
(which let us suppose happens to be true26), one must 
(1) have sufficiently serious suspicions that p is true (i.e. believe that there is a 
sufficiently high probability that p is true27), and  
(2) deliberately (as opposed to negligently or recklessly) fail to take reasonably 
available steps to learn with greater certainty whether p actually is true. 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, this is how I will understand willful ignorance in this paper.28 One 
quick clarification about “deliberately,” a term I adopt from Global-Tech.29 Paradigmatically, to 																																																								
22 This is arguably the strategy employed by the MPC. As the MPC commentary explains, its definition of 
knowledge in “[p]aragraph [2.02](7) deals with the situation British commentators have denominated ‘wilful 
blindness’ or ‘connivance.’” MPC 129-30 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
23 Husak and Callender, supra note 8 at 37-38. 
24 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, 2d ed., 157 (1961).  
25 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070. 
26 It is not clear if a person can be willfully ignorant of a proposition that is false. However, this need not concern us, 
since (barring abuses) one is not likely to be charged with a knowledge crime unless the inculpatory proposition is 
plausibly true. (Granted one might still be charged with the attempt to do the knowledge crime. But since the mens 
rea for attempt is intent, not knowledge, willful ignorance seems unlikely to figure into many attempt prosecutions.) 
27 I leave it open that what counts as a “sufficiently high probability” here might vary depending on features of the 
context, e.g. the magnitude of harm that is at stake.  
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deliberately fail to investigate involves acting with the purpose to preserve one’s ignorance. 
Many courts seem to adopt this meaning of “deliberately preserving one’s ignorance.”30 On the 
other hand, some courts suggest that even when the defendant did not have the purpose to remain 
in ignorance, a merely knowing failure to investigate can also suffice for willful ignorance. This 
is suggested especially by courts that require only “conscious avoidance” of inculpatory 
knowledge.31 On this view, one could be willfully ignorant if one acted in ways that one is 
practically certain will preserve one’s ignorance, even if this is not one’s purpose or aim. 
However, I mention this complication only to set it aside. For purposes of clarity, I focus on the 
first, more familiar type of willful ignorance. (My arguments should mostly go through 
regardless of which view is adopted, though I will note where it makes a difference.) 
As noted below, one might add more elements to the basic account of willful ignorance. Still, 
the basic account yields the broadest version of the equal culpability thesis that is still plausible:  
Unrestricted Equal Culpability Thesis (“UECT”): Suppose A1 and A2 each perform 
the actus reus of a given crime that requires knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, p. 
A1 and A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every respect except for one: 
while A1’s action is performed with knowledge of p, A2’s action is performed in 																																																																																																																																																																																		
28 Note also that Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan have argued that willful ignorance may be regarded as a type 
of recklessness: “The prototypical willfully ignorant actor is, of course, reckless. The risk he is taking—of, say, 
smuggling drugs—is an unjustifiable one.” Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 16 at 34. (Hellman criticizes this view, 
but acknowledges that Alexander & Ferzan can respond. See Hellman supra note 13 at 311.) Still, the question I 
address in this paper arises for Alexander and Ferzan’s recklessness account, too. They are correct that the willfully 
ignorant actor generally is at least reckless. But some cases of willful ignorance seem especially culpable—indeed, 
as culpable as the analogous conduct done with knowledge (practical certainty) of the inculpatory proposition. And 
one might want to know what it is, precisely, about opting to remain in ignorance about the risks of one’s conduct 
that could increase the actor’s culpability from the level of a reckless wrongdoer up to the level of a knowing 
wrongdoer. It is precisely this question that my account seeks to answer. Thus, my account can be seen as one way 
of fleshing out Alexander and Ferzan’s view that willful ignorance is a form of recklessness. (For related reasons, 
my account also differs from Tadros’s account of willful blindness. See infra note 104.) 
29 131 S.Ct. at 2070. 
30 See, e.g., Jewell 532 F.2d at 700 (requiring “conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that which was in the 
vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth”) (emphasis added); Heredia, 483 F.3d at 918 
(observing that “when Congress made it a crime to ‘knowingly...possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance,’ (…) it meant to punish not only those who know they possess a controlled 
substance, but also those who don’t know because they don’t want to know”) (emphasis added). See also Williams, 
supra note 24 at 157 (noting that a party is willful ignorant if he “has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately 
omits to make further enquiries because he wishes to remain in ignorance”) (emphasis added). 
31 United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding “that the jury was properly instructed 
that conscious avoidance could…be used to infer knowledge of the conspiracy’s unlawful objectives”). 
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willful ignorance of p in the basic sense. On these suppositions, A2 is (at least) as 
culpable for her action as A1 is for his. 
 
A number of courts appear to accept this claim.32 Nonetheless, UECT is false. As some legal 
scholars recognize, there are cases in which willfully ignorant individuals seem less culpable 
than their knowing counterparts.33 To see why this is so, let me first explain the challenge for 
defending UECT. Then I’ll argue that the only obvious answer to this challenge fails. 
1.1  A principle about culpability and a question 
The criminal law is often thought to embody the idea that the more confidence one has in the 
truth of the inculpatory proposition, all else equal, the more culpable one is when one does the 
actus reus.34 More precisely: 
Comparative Confidence Principle (CCP): For any two people who commit the actus 
reus of a crime, if they are identical in all respects except that one is more confident in 
the truth of the inculpatory proposition, p, than the other, then—assuming there are no 
relevant excuses or justifications, and all else is equal—the person with the greater 
degree of confidence in p is more culpable than the one with the lesser degree of 
confidence in p.35 
 
If CCP is correct, it would account for the intuition, say, that lighting a building on fire while 
aware of a substantial risk that a person is inside (i.e. reckless) is somewhat less culpable—even 
if just a bit—than lighting it on fire while practically certain (knowing) that a person is inside.36 																																																								
32 The Supreme Court’s statement of the “traditional rationale” employs this broad version of the thesis. Global-
Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069 (noting that the willfully ignorant “are just as culpable as those who have actual 
knowledge”). See also United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (“deliberate ignorance 
and positive knowledge are equally culpable”); Heredia, 483 F.3d at 926 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“wilful 
blindness is ‘equally culpable’ to…positive knowledge”); United States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 255 (3d Cir. 
2010) United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, V.I.N. SRH-16266 By & Through Goodman, 43 F.3d 794, 808 (3d Cir. 
1994) (discussing “the mainstream conception of willful blindness as a state of mind of much greater culpability 
than simple negligence or recklessness, and more akin to knowledge”); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1570 
(11th Cir. 1991) (acts of “deliberate ignorance and acts…with positive knowledge are equally culpable”). 
33 See Hellman, supra note 13 at 305-12; infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text; Michaels, supra note 12 at 986. 
34 Larry Aleander and Kimberly Ferzan adopt what essentially amounts to this principle. They “are inclined to say 
that culpability does vary with the actor’s estimate of the probability” of the relevant risks. Alexander & Ferzan, 
supra note 16 at 38. Charlow also suggests that the criminal law endorses such a principle: “the more certain [the 
defendant] is that some significant fact exists that will make his conduct criminal, (…) the more blameworthy he is 
if he goes ahead and acts despite his awareness of that fact.” Charlow, supra note 2 at 1394-95. 
35 To be clear, this principle employs one’s subjective confidence in the relevant proposition.  
36 Cf. N.Y. Penal Law § 150.15. 
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The latter, after all, appears to manifest greater disregard for others than the former. 
If CCP is roughly right, it raises a question about how acting in willful ignorance could 
possibly be as culpable as knowing misconduct. Defendants for whom a willful ignorance jury 
instruction is actually needed will fall short of having knowledge of the inculpatory proposition, 
p (provided the proof at trial suffices). After all, were the defendant certain enough of p to 
qualify as having knowledge, it would not be necessary to convict her on a willful ignorance 
theory. Accordingly, when willful ignorance jury instructions really are needed, the defendant 
will have a lower confidence in p than a similarly situated actor with knowledge. Thus, by CCP, 
such a defendant would be less culpable than her knowing counterpart (all else equal).  
What, then, could the general feature of willful ignorance be that would always make up for 
the difference in culpability that CCP entails will normally exist between actors with a sub-
knowledge degree of belief in p and actors with knowledge that p? Let “CR” be the culpability of 
doing the actus reus while aware of a substantial risk (i.e. while suspecting) that p is true, and 
“CK” be the higher culpability level of doing the actus reus while knowing (i.e. while practically 
certain) that p is true. Unless we can find something present in all cases of willful ignorance that 
could fill the gap between CR and CK—call it “ΔC”—we could not maintain, as UECT asserts, 
that willfully ignorant misconduct is always as culpable as knowing misconduct. 
1.2  The only obvious answer to the question does not succeed  
The only obvious answer to this question—the only feature common to all cases of willful 
ignorance that might explain how it could always be as bad as knowing misconduct—is the fact 
that willfully ignorant actors all deliberately preserve their ignorance about p. However, this 
answer fails. Sometimes the decision to remain in ignorance can be justified—either fully (such 
that it is not culpable at all) or partially (such that it is less culpable than it would be absent the 
justifying circumstances). Sometimes, that is, there can be good reasons for not investigating. In 
	 10 
that case, the decision not to investigate would manifest less insufficient regard for the protected 
interests of others than if there were no justification for preserving one’s ignorance. Thus, there 
is no guarantee that the decision to remain in ignorance of p will always provide the required 
amount of culpability, ΔC, needed to get the defendant up from CR to CK.  
Many sorts of considerations might help justify the decision to remain in ignorance. The 
simplest concerns the difficulties or dangers of investigating. In general, the more burdensome, 
dangerous or costly it would be to investigate one’s suspicions that p, the less culpable one 
seems, all else equal, for deciding not to learn whether p is true. Consider: 
Dangerous Investigation: Cory rents a house to Dora, and suspects that Dora might be 
manufacturing drugs in the basement. Cory could investigate by sneaking into the basement. 
However, he knows the basement contains a fungus that he and his children are dangerously 
allergic to (though the allergy is rare in the general population). If Cory comes home with 
some of the fungus on his clothes, his kids could also suffer a severe allergic reaction. So 
Cory concludes it is too dangerous to investigate (and there is no one else to do it for him). 
Accordingly, he decides to preserve his ignorance and avoids going into the house altogether.  
 
If Cory knew the house he was renting to Dora was being used for manufacturing drugs, he could 
be convicted of aiding and abetting Dora’s drug operation.37 However, here, Cory does not know 
this (though, let’s suppose, it is in fact true). Nor does Cory’s willful ignorance seem to render 
him as culpable as an analogous knowing wrongdoer. After all, investigating his suspicions 
would risk a painful (if not deadly) allergic reaction for both himself and his kids, and this seems 
to at least partially justify his decision to preserve his ignorance. Granted, if investigating 
entailed no burdens whatsoever (e.g. if he merely was feeling lazy and couldn’t be bothered to 
look in the basement), then the decision to remain in ignorance plausibly would entail enough 
extra culpability to get him up from CR up to CK. But in this case, there are at least some good 
reasons for him to remain in ignorance. Even if they do not fully justify the decision to remain in 
																																																								
37 United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 295 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction for aiding and abetting where 
mother was aware of the drug operation out of her home).  
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ignorance, they plausibly do still make him less culpable than the analogous knowing wrongdoer 
would have been. Thus, we have a counter-example to UECT. 
One might object that one cannot be truly willfully ignorant if investigating is not practically 
possible. But since investigating risks an allergic reaction for Cory and his kids, he has no 
reasonably available way to investigate. Thus, one might insist, he is not really willfully 
ignorant.38 However, this reply is unconvincing. Granted, if the only way Cory could investigate 
his suspicions would get him killed, then perhaps we could say investigating is not practically 
possible or that he has no reasonably available way to investigate. But that is not what we have 
here. This is a case where the costs of investigating are not so severe as to make the instant 
investigative methods count as practically impossible or not reasonably available. It is more 
accurate to say that Cory has an available method of investigation (one that he on balance should 
use), but it entails risks of pain for himself and his kids. It’s doubtful that these risks fully justify 
his decision to remain in ignorance in this case, but they plausibly do justify it at least partially. 
Thus, his decision to remain in ignorance still amounts to genuine willful ignorance.  
Accordingly, we have an objection to refute UECT. If the gap between CR and CK is 
especially large (as it would if one has a credence in p that is well below the knowledge 
threshold), then having reasons that help justify the decision to remain in ignorance can prevent a 
willfully ignorant defendant from being as culpable as her knowing counterpart. 
Other considerations can also help justify the choice to remain in ignorance. As Deborah 
																																																								
38 The defendant in Heredia argued that she should not be convicted on willful ignorance grounds because she 
declined to investigate whether her car contained drugs only for safety reasons, given that she was driving on the 
highway. 483 F.3d at 920. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that “[a] decision influenced by 
coercion, exigent circumstances or lack of meaningful choice is, perforce, not deliberate. A defendant who fails to 
investigate for these reasons has not deliberately chosen to avoid learning the truth.” Id. However, this view can only 
be taken so far. Clearly, it can’t be the case that whenever investigating entails risks or costs, that makes the decision 
not to investigate non-willful. After all, almost any decision not to investigate will be the result of perceived 
pressures against investigating. But this cannot mean that hardly anyone is ever willfully ignorant. Instead, only 
truly exigent circumstances or coercion (etc.) could plausibly make deciding not to investigate count as non-willful. 
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Hellman has argued, one’s professional obligations also might do so. 39 On her view, criminal 
defense lawyers and doctors treating patients who claim to suffer from chronic pain can 
sometimes have a justification, in virtue of their professional roles, for remaining in ignorance.40 
The defense lawyer might suspect that her client is not telling the truth, thus making the lawyer’s 
arguments to the court potentially perjurious. Nonetheless, in virtue of the lawyer’s duties of 
loyalty and zealous representation, she might be justified in deciding not to investigate her 
doubts about her client’s claims.41 Thus, the lawyer plausibly is less culpable than the analogous 
actor who knows the client is lying and repeats these falsehoods to the court. Similarly, the 
doctor might suspect that her patient is illegally reselling the prescribed medication, but because 
of the doctor’s duties to the patient, she might be justified in not investigating these suspicions 
and continuing to prescribe the pain medication anyway.42 Such a doctor might not seem as 
culpable as her knowing counterpart who prescribes medication knowing it will be illegally 
resold. These cases provide yet further counter-examples to UECT.43  
Thus, Hellman’s cases show that there can sometimes also be ethical costs to investigating, 
which might lessen the culpability of deciding to remain in ignorance. In other work, I have 
argued that some non-professional relationships can function analogously.44 In particular, the 
special obligations one owes to family, friends and loved ones give rise to cases where willfully 
ignorant actors seem less culpable than their knowing counterparts. Consider: 
Overly Trusting Parent. Patty and her adult child, Charles, had gone through a long 
period of estrangement due to Charles’ trouble with the law, and they were only 																																																								
39 See Hellman, supra note 13 at 305-12. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 305-06. 
42 Id. at 308-09. 
43 Hellman thinks these justifications are supposed to be “objective” in the sense that they apply regardless of 
whether they actually motivated the actor to remain in ignorance. See id. at 307. I discuss this feature of Hellman’s 
view below in section 4. I want to remain neutral on this aspect of her view for purposes of this article. 
44 See Alex Sarch, Willful Ignorance, Culpability and the Criminal Law, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1023, 1066-69 
(2014); see also Hellman, supra note 13 at 316. 
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recently reconciled. Thus, Patty is very concerned to rebuild trust with her son. When 
Charles asks Patty to drive a sealed crate across town to a friend of his, Patty decides 
not to look inside.  She considers the risk that the crate might contain some kind of 
contraband, and she strongly desires not to take part in any illegal activity.45 But after 
much agonizing, she deliberately chooses not to open the crate or ask Charles to do so 
because this sign of mistrust would irrevocably damage their recently repaired 
relationship. It is her conscious object to remain in ignorance because this is the means 
to preserving her relationship with Charles. And so she sets off across town with the 
crate in the trunk. On the way, she is pulled over by the police and it turns out that the 
crate contains drugs.  
 
Patty is willfully ignorant about whether the crate contains drugs, and she likely could be 
convicted of possession of drugs on a willful ignorance theory. Nonetheless, because there are 
understandable and plausibly decent reasons for Patty not to investigate her suspicions, she 
intuitively seems less culpable than someone who acts the same way with knowledge. The 
person who is told in advance and thus knows that the crate contains drugs, but decides to deliver 
the package anyway, would seem to display more disregard than Patty did for society’s 
legitimate interest in combating the proliferation of drugs. Thus, although willfully ignorant and 
very likely somewhat culpable, Patty intuitively is less culpable than her knowing counterpart.46 
																																																								
45 To further bolster our intuition about this case, we might also suppose that Patty would not have helped Charles 
were she certain it would involve transporting illegal items. Thus, she does not satisfy the counterfactual test 
discussed below in Section 3. However, for the reasons explained there, we must be careful about using intuitions 
about counterfactual conduct when assessing one’s actual culpability.  
46 To this, one might object that Patty perhaps does not purposefully remain in ignorance, but remains in ignorance 
only knowingly. As a result, she is perhaps not truly willfully ignorant. In that case, this would not be a counter-
example to UECT. As noted above, some courts do allow knowingly preserving one’s ignorance to count as willful 
ignorance—especially courts that allow “conscious avoidance” to satisfy the knowledge element of a crime. See 
supra note 31 and accompanying text. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that willful ignorance requires the 
purpose to remain in ignorance, Patty still qualifies as willfully ignorant. As stated, Patty deliberately chooses not to 
investigate whether her son’s crate contained illicit items. This is one of her conscious objectives. She aimed at 
ignorance as the means to achieving her other ends. (In general, to count as bringing about an end E purposefully, 
one need not aim at E as an end in itself; rather, it suffices for one to aim at E as a means to other ends one has. For 
example, if one kills one’s uncle merely as the means to getting one’s inheritance, the killing still would count as 
purposeful. See also Warren Quinn, Actions, Intentions and Consequences, 18 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
334, 336 (suggesting that bombing civilians as the means to ending a war is an intentional action that is harder to 
justify than bombing a munitions factory for the same reason while merely knowing that it will cause civilian 
casualties).) Since Patty aims at ignorance as the means to preserving her relationship with her son, she remains in 
ignorance purposefully. So she counts as willfully ignorant. 
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Accordingly, many cases show UECT to be false. An actor can sometimes have good reasons 
that help justify the decision not to acquire full-on knowledge,47 and so there is no guarantee that 
doing the actus reus in willful ignorance will always be as culpable as doing it with knowledge.  
 
2. Restricting the Equal Culpability Thesis: First Pass—Husak & Callender  
 
Given the failure of UECT, the obvious response is to restrict the equal culpability thesis. In 
theory, the restrictions might take one of two forms. First, the restriction might be expressly built 
into the thesis, so that it would claim that provided certain conditions obtain, acting with willful 
ignorance in its basic form is at least as culpable as acting with knowledge. Second, one might 
replace the basic account of willful ignorance with a narrower technical conception of willful 
ignorance, which one then uses to formulate the equal culpability thesis. I think it matters little 
which method of restriction is adopted, since either one provides what is needed: a restricted 
version of the equal culpability thesis. (However, I suspect that the first route is likely to be more 
transparent than the latter.) 
As it happens, courts and commentators seem largely to have taken the second route. For 
instance, Husak and Callender adopt this narrower conception of willful ignorance: 
a defendant is wilfully ignorant of an incriminating proposition p when he is suspicious that p is true, has 
good reason to think p true, fails to pursue reliable, quick, and ordinary measures that would enable him 
to learn the truth of p, and, finally, has a conscious desire to remain ignorant of p in order to avoid blame 
or liability in the event that he is detected.48 
 
They dub this last requirement—i.e. that one’s reason for opting to remain ignorant is the desire 
“to preserve a possible defense from blame or liability”—the “motivational condition.”49  The 
Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits take it that this particular reason for remaining ignorant is a 																																																								
47 I mean for this phrase—“have good reasons that help justify the decision to remain in ignorance”—to be neutral 
between Hellman’s objectivist view and the subjectivist view that one’s actual motives matter to the legal notion of 
criminal culpability. Perhaps having such a reason requires only being in circumstances that help justify remaining 
in ignorance, or perhaps it requires that the justifying considerations actually were what motivated one to decide not 
to investigate. Either view is covered by this phrase. See section 4 for more discussion. 
48 Husak and Callender, supra note 8 at 40 (emphasis added). 
49 Id. 
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necessary part of willful ignorance.50 The charitable way to understand what these courts and 
commentators are up to is to see them as restricting the notion of willful ignorance in order to get 
a definition of willful ignorance that, if satisfied, makes the defendant especially culpable—
plausibly as culpable as a knowing actor. Plugging this notion of willful ignorance into the equal 
culpability thesis would end up restricting it to conditions in which it more plausibly holds: 
Restricted Equal Culpability Thesis 1 (“RECT1”): Suppose A1 and A2 each perform 
the actus reus of a crime requiring knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, p. A1 and 
A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every respect except for one: while A1’s 
action is performed with knowledge of p, A2’s action is performed in a state of willful 
ignorance the motive for which was to avoid liability in the event of prosecution. On these 
suppositions, A2 is (at least) as culpable for her action as A1 is for his. 
 
However, RECT1 also faces problems. Hellman contends it is inappropriate for the criminal 
law to concern itself with the precise motives of the actor.51 Thus, on her view, the doctor who 
decides not to investigate for bad reasons like the desire to avoid liability should be treated no 
different for legal purposes than the doctor who decides not to investigate from a justifiable 
concern for her ethical duties to her patients.52 Both actors occupy a professional role that 
actually justifies their ignorance, she contends. While I think Hellman’s view is plausible 
particularly when it comes to criminal culpability (the legal concept),53 others might disagree 
insofar as they think actual motives can impact even criminal culpability (not just moral 
blameworthiness). I want to remain neutral on this difficult issue here, however. 
Instead, I think RECT1 faces other problems, which both Hellman and those who think 
motives matter can accept. First, the desire to preserve a defense against liability does not always 
seem disqualifying, since there can be cases where the defendant’s circumstances help justify the 																																																								
50 United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002) (requiring that the defendant, to be willfully blind, 
had to have “purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense against subsequent 
prosecution”); United States v. Delreal-Ordones, 213 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. 
Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1149 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).  
51 Hellman, supra note 13 at 310-11. 
52 Id.  
53 I defend the motive-insensitivity of the legal notion of culpability in other work. See Sarch, supra note 16. 
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desire to preserve a defense and the overall decision to remain ignorant.54 Consider a variation of 
Dangerous Investigation. Suppose Cory not only realizes that investigating would be risky for 
himself and his kids, but he also wants to preserve a defense against liability should Dora’s drug 
operation (if it exists) be discovered by the authorities. This, in turn, is because Cory is the sole 
caretaker for his children, and if he gets in trouble with the law for aiding Dora’s (possible) drug 
operation, his kids will be gravely harmed by the appalling foster care system in the city. 
Accordingly, given the facts Cory is aware of, the decision not to investigate is supported by two 
considerations: 1) it would prevent his kids from suffering a severe allergic reaction, and 2) by 
preserving a defense for himself, it makes his kids less likely to suffer at the hands of the broken 
foster care system. These considerations, grounded in a concern for Cory’s children, plausibly 
provide at least some justification for his decision to remain in ignorance. Accordingly, even 
though Cory was motivated in part by a desire to preserve a defense, he does not seem as 
culpable as the analogous wrongdoer who rents the house to Dora knowing that she is engaged in 
a drug operation. The upshot is that, contrary to what RECT1 asserts, being motivated to remain 
in ignorance by a desire to preserve a defense does not necessarily make one as culpable as the 
analogous knowing wrongdoer. (Hellman and the “motives matter” approach might offer 
different explanations of why this is, but they can both agree RECT1 gets this case wrong.) 
In addition, as I’ve argued elsewhere, RECT1 seems too narrow.55 Sometimes there is no 
way that preserving one’s ignorance would seem to help one avoid liability and therefore can be 
no part of one’s motives, but remaining in ignorance still is highly unjustified. Thus, there are 
cases that fall outside the scope of RECT1, but where the actor still seems just as culpable as his 
knowing counterpart. Consider: 																																																								
54 If Hellman’s objectivist view is adopted, we can put the point by saying that some actors who preserve their 
ignorance because they desire to preserve a defense might nonetheless be in justifying circumstances that support 
their ignorance (regardless of whether these circumstances actually are what motivated them to remain ignorant). 
55 Sarch, supra 44 at 1073-74. 
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Don’t Rock the Boat.  Fred works the night shift at a warehouse, and he has heard 
rumors that the boxes he spends his nights loading and unloading contain drugs. His 
suspicions are strengthened when the boss starts giving him a weekly bonus for “doing a 
good job and minding your own business.” Fred realizes he could check whether the 
contents of the boxes are improper by lifting up the box flaps, but not so much that the 
packing tape rips. However, this would still stretch the packing tape, and Fred thinks 
there is a chance that investigating in this way might tip off the boss to his snooping. If 
the boss thinks Fred knows too much, the bonuses will stop and he might lose his job.  
Fred wants the bonuses, though, and so he doesn’t investigate. He does not think that 
remaining in ignorance would have any benefits in terms of preserving a defense to 
liability. (Even if his boss were running a drug operation, Fred knows the cops are not 
skillful enough to uncover it, and even if they did, the authorities would never prosecute.) 
Instead, the only expected benefit of preserving his ignorance that occurs to him is that it 
will help him continue to get paid. As it happens, Fred’s suspicions were correct: the boss 
is engaged in transporting drugs and stolen goods, and the weekly bonuses stem from the 
fruits of this operation.56  
 
Fred is willfully ignorant (in the basic sense), but his reason for not investigating is not that he 
hopes it will help him avoid liability. He thus falls outside of the scope of RECT1. Instead, the 
only benefit he sees in not investigating is that it will let him continue to get paid. Intuitively, 
Fred’s decision not to investigate is highly unjustified. Thus, he plausibly is just as culpable as a 
similarly situated person who did Fred’s job while knowing what was in the boxes. After all, 
choosing not to investigate for fear that doing so will prevent one from continuing to get paid 
seems to demonstrate just as much disregard for legally protected interests as knowingly 
committing the crime (as some courts have recognized57). Since RECT1 would not support 
giving willful ignorance jury instructions for defendants like Fred, RECT1 is too narrow.58 
 
3. Restricting the Equal Culpability Thesis: Second Pass—Luban, Michaels 
																																																								
56 Id.  
57 See, e.g., Jandro v. Ohio Edison Co., 167 F.3d 309, 316 (6th Cir. 1999) (“employer [wa]s virtually certain that 
harm [wa]s about to occur but cho[se] to ‘look the other way’ in the interest of continuing the job”); Fiore v. C.I.R., 
105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1141, at *30 (Tax Court 2013) (holding that the defendant committed tax fraud because he was 
willfully blind “for the purpose of getting and keeping clients”).  
58 One might try to save RECT1 from this problem by recasting it just as sufficient condition for equal culpability. 
But that would be unsatisfying because then it could no longer plausibly be a comprehensive account of the 
conditions in which willful ignorant conduct is as culpable as knowing misconduct. Moreover, it would still suffer 
from my first objection. 
	 18 
A better—but I’ll argue still problematic—way to restrict the equal culpability thesis is the 
counterfactual approach suggested separately by Alan Michaels and David Luban. The basic idea 
is that a willfully ignorant actor is at least as culpable as an analogous knowing wrongdoer just in 
case she would still perform the actus reus of the crime even if she were given full knowledge of 
the inculpatory proposition. 
This approach has been defended most explicitly by Michaels.59 He begins by defining a 
mental state he dubs acceptance: “The accepting actor is someone who, aware of a substantial 
risk that a particular circumstance is present or that a particular result might ensue, is so 
determined to act that he would do so even if he knew the circumstance was present or that the 
result would ensue.”60  Michaels then contends that “those who act with [the mental state of] 
acceptance are as culpable as those who act with knowledge. Those who act without acceptance 
are less culpable than those who act with knowledge. Therefore, acceptance is neither 
underinclusive nor overinclusive.”61  Accordingly, Michaels’s view corresponds to the following 
restricted version of the equal culpability thesis: 
Restricted Equal Culpability Thesis 2 (RECT2): Suppose A1 and A2 each perform 
the actus reus of a crime requiring knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, p. A1 
and A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every respect except that A1’s 
action is performed with actual knowledge of p, while A2’s action is performed in a 
state of willful ignorance, and A2 is such that if she were given actual knowledge of p, 
she would still perform the actus reus. On these suppositions, A2 is (at least) as 
culpable for her action as A1 is for his. 
 
David Luban’s discussion of willful ignorance can also be read as an endorsement of the 
counterfactual test embodied in RECT2.62  He suggests that the concept of willful ignorance 
encompasses three prototypical cases. First, there is the fox, who “aims to do wrong and 
																																																								
59 Michaels, supra note 12. 
60 Id. at 957. 
61 Id. at 995. 
62 Luban, supra note 11 at 968-69. 
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structures his own ignorance merely to prepare a defense.”63 Second is the unrighteous ostrich 
who “doesn’t want to know she is doing wrong, but would do it even if she knew.”64 Third, the 
half-righteous ostrich “shields herself from guilty knowledge, but would actually do the right 
thing if the shield were to fail.”65 That is, she, too, does not want to know that what she is doing 
is wrong, but would not do it if given knowledge that it is wrong. 
Luban contends that the fox is as culpable as the purposeful actor, the unrighteous ostrich as 
culpable as the knowing actor and the half-righteous ostrich as culpable as one who is reckless.66 
The fox would do the act even if given knowledge of its true nature, and merely is engaged in a 
clever attempt to set up a defense, and so he seems to act with the purpose of performing the 
action.67 By contrast, the unrighteous ostrich does not affirmatively desire the crime, but would 
also do it even if given knowledge.  Thus, Luban claims the unrighteous ostrich is “precisely 
fitted for the commonlaw equation of willful ignorance with knowledge,” since “[b]y definition, 
her guilt is unchanged whether she knows or not, because her behavior would be unchanged.”68  
However, the half-righteous ostrich, “who won’t do wrong if she knows, but would prefer not to 
know, is in a state of conscious avoidance of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of wrongdoing—
precisely the [MPC’s] definition of recklessness.”69   
Thus, Luban’s discussion suggests that defendants who fit the pattern of either the fox or the 
unrighteous ostrich would be at least as culpable as a similarly situated wrongdoer with 
knowledge. Accordingly, the equal culpability thesis would be true of such actors. But since the 
half-righteous ostrich is only as culpable as a reckless wrongdoer, the equal culpability thesis 																																																								
63 Id. at 969. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 969 (the fox, “who aims to do wrong and structures his own ignorance merely to prepare a defense, has the 
same level of culpability as any other willful wrongdoer-the highest level, in the [MPC] schema.”).  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
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would not hold of defendants in this category. What separates the fox and the unrighteous ostrich 
from the half-righteous ostrich is that the latter would not do the actus reus if given actual 
knowledge of the inculpatory proposition, while the fox and the unrighteous ostrich would. Thus, 
Luban also endorses the counterfactual test for equal culpability embodied in RECT2.  
Although RECT2 seems more plausible than RECT1, I argue that RECT2 still suffers 
from fatal flaws. The problem it faces is an instance of the general criticism that Kenneth 
Simons has leveled against the counterfactual nature of Michaels’ “acceptance” criterion.70 
Simons points out that punishing on the basis of a counterfactual mental state that one would 
have acted on, but actually did not act on, amounts to punishing merely for character.71 This 
problem afflicts RECT2 because it allows us to take willfully ignorant defendants who 
actually lacked knowledge to be just as culpable as knowing wrongdoers solely on the basis 
of how the former would have behaved under non-actual circumstances. RECT2 thus ties the 
willfully ignorant defendant’s culpability not to the mental state she actually acted with, but 
rather to a mental state she merely was willing to act with.  
This conflicts with a fundamental principle of criminal law. In particular, the criminal 
law takes it that culpability attributions and resulting punishments must be tied to the nature 
of one’s actual conduct and mental states—not how one would have behaved under non-
actual circumstances. As Simons explains, “the harsh sanctions of the criminal law should 
not be brought to bear on individuals who have not yet done anything wrong, but who merely 
																																																								
70 Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad Character”? 
Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219, 267-75 (2002). 
71 Simons notes that appealing to “counterfactual culpability is highly problematic.” Id. at 269. To illustrate, he uses 
a version of Alexander’s case of Deborah who engages in Sunday driving within the speed limit. Id. at 269-70. 
Suppose she is so callous that “even if she were to come to believe that the risks imposed by her Sunday driving 
were much higher than she actually believes them to be, she would continue to drive notwithstanding that belief. 
(…) Deborah is not acting recklessly at this moment and is therefore not culpable. She has an undesirable character 
trait, one that might dispose her to act recklessly if the circumstances were right, but her counterfactual culpability 
does not translate into present culpability.” Id.  
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have disreputable—or even dangerous—character traits. (…) We are similarly, and properly, 
reluctant to impose punishment on a person simply for [attitudes or characteristics] unless 
and until [they] are expressed in action.”72 It is for this reason, for example, that when Bill 
drives off with the intent to kill his uncle but carelessly hits and kills a pedestrian who just 
happens to be his uncle, we do not say Bill is guilty of murder.73 Granted, we know his 
character is as deplorable as a murderer’s, given that he would have killed his uncle 
intentionally had he gotten the chance. But Bill’s culpability for the act at issue—his careless 
driving—is not as great as the culpability he would have incurred from an intentional killing. 
In general, it’s not true that P’s doing A with mental state M is just as culpable as her doing 
A with a worse mental state M* simply because P would have done A with M*. 
As a result, RECT2 faces counterexamples. Consider a revised version of Overly Trusting 
Parent. This was the case in which Patty decides not to look in the crate her son asks her to 
drive across town because she does not want to jeopardize the little bit of trust they had 
recently rebuilt. I claimed Patty’s act was intuitively less culpable than the analogous action 
would be if performed with full-fledged knowledge that the crate contained drugs. Now add 
just one small detail: Patty is so concerned not to damage her recently rebuilt relationship 
with her son that she would have agreed to drive the package across town even if her son had 
confessed to her that it contained drugs. In fact, however, her son does not tell her this. So 
she proceeds to drive the crate across town without looking inside—that is, in willful 
ignorance. Thus, Patty in the revised case—“Patty 2”—performs exactly the same action as 
Patty in the original version of Overly Trusting Parent—“Patty 1.” Although we know Patty 
2 would have been willing to behave the same way even if given full-fledged knowledge of 
																																																								
72 Simons, supra note 70 at 233-34. 
73 Id. at 232. 
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what the crate contained, this is not actually the mental state she acted with. Thus, the 
culpability that is manifested in Patty 2’s actual conduct in the revised case is exactly the 
same as the amount of culpability manifested in Patty 1’s identical conduct in the original 
case. If I am correct that Patty 1’s culpability for acting as she did in the original case is less 
than that of the analogous knowing wrongdoer, then the same must be true in the revised 
case as well. That is, Patty 2 is likewise less culpable for her willfully ignorant conduct in the 
revised case than the analogous actor with full-fledged knowledge.  
Of course, in the revised case, we know that Patty 2’s character is as deplorable as that of 
someone who acts the same way with full-fledged knowledge. But it does not follow that her 
culpability for her actual conduct (i.e. transporting the crate in willful ignorance) is as great 
as the culpability she would have incurred from knowingly doing the same thing. It is 
essential not to allow one’s intuitions about the defects in Patty 2’s character to infect one’s 
judgment about Patty 2’s culpability for her actual conduct. The additional badness in Patty 
2’s character compared to Patty 1’s does not seem to be manifested in what Patty 2 did, since 
on any natural description, the two actors behaved exactly the same. Thus, if we are careful 
not to let intuitions about character affect our judgment of how culpable the actor’s conduct 
was, then there should be no barrier to agreeing that Patty 2—just like Patty 1, who behaved 
the same way—is less culpable for her conduct than the analogous knowing wrongdoer.  
Accordingly, we have a counterexample to RECT2. This is a case where a willfully 
ignorant actor who would perform the actus reus even with knowledge nonetheless is not as 
culpable for her actual conduct as the analogous knowing wrongdoer would be for hers. The 
willfully ignorant actor’s willingness to do the actus reus even in full knowledge thus is not 
sufficient for her conduct to be as culpable as the analogous knowing act. 
	 23 
Nor is this necessary for the willfully ignorant actor’s conduct to be as culpable as the 
analogous knowing misconduct. Sometimes willfully ignorant conduct seems just as culpable 
as knowing misconduct even though the actor would not perform the actus reus in full 
knowledge. Suppose Jeff is hired to burn down a Catholic school. Jeff went to Catholic 
school himself, and became conditioned to be constitutionally unable to knowingly harm any 
member of the clergy. As Jeff is about to light the school on fire, he notices a car of the sort 
that priests drive parked outside. Thus, he comes to suspect that a priest is in the building. 
However, Jeff is aware that he will not be able to go through with the arson if he investigates 
and learns that a priest is inside. Therefore, wanting to still get paid for the job, Jeff decides 
not to investigate whether a priest is in the building and he proceeds to light the fire.74 
It is plausible, I suggest, that Jeff’s act, although done in willful ignorance as to the 
presence of a person in the building, is just as culpable as the analogous act performed with 
full knowledge that someone is in the building. After all, Jeff’s decision not to investigate— 
which he knows is the necessary means to being able to go through with the crime and get 
paid—is highly unjustified, thus making his course of conduct particularly culpable. Indeed, 
his willfully ignorant conduct seems just as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct 
even though it was stipulated that Jeff would not light the building on fire with full 
knowledge. Accordingly, being willing to perform the actus reus even with full knowledge 
also is not a necessary condition for a willfully ignorant act to be as culpable as the 
analogous knowing misconduct. 
 
4. Restricting the Equal Culpability Thesis: Third Pass—Hellman 
Deborah Hellman’s work suggests a different approach to restricting the equal culpability 
																																																								
74 In Luban’s terms, Jeff is akin to a fox who simply would not be able to do the actus reus with full knowledge. 
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thesis. I think this approach is on the right track, but I argue that it, too, requires refinement. 
Hellman “propose[s] that contrived ignorance [is blameworthy] when the actor’s blindness about 
the relevant fact is not justified.”75 Rather than focus on whether the risks imposed by the actus 
reus are justified (which is relevant to determine if the actor is reckless), Hellman’s 
“approach…brings this burden of justification to bear on a different decision—the decision to 
remain blind.”76 Moreover, she clarifies that she “rejects Husak & Callender’s ‘motivation’ 
criterion” and claims that “we ought instead to ask whether there are good reasons for the actor 
to choose blindness rather than focus on what reasons actually motivated the actor in choosing 
blindness.”77 Formulating this as a version of the equal culpability thesis, we get: 
Restricted Equal Culpability Thesis 3 (“RECT3”): Suppose A1 and A2 each perform 
the actus reus of a crime requiring knowledge of an inculpatory proposition, p. A1 and 
A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every respect except that A1’s action is 
performed with actual knowledge of p, while A2’s action is performed in a state of 
willful ignorance toward p and A2’s decision to remain ignorant is unjustified. On these 
suppositions, A2 is (at least) as culpable for her action as A1 is for his. 
 
The main difficulty for RECT3 is that it is over-inclusive. This is because while it’s plausible 
that any instance of unjustified willful ignorance is somewhat culpable, there is no guarantee that 
it will always provide enough additional culpability to get the willfully ignorant actor up to the 
level of culpability of the analogous knowing wrongdoer. The mere fact that one’s decision to 
remain in ignorance is unjustified does not always suffice to make one’s action as culpable as the 
corresponding knowing misconduct. Consider: 
Product Manager: Karen is in charge of developing a certain drug that cures Alzheimer’s 
if taken early enough. She is aware that there is some risk that the drug will have 
seriously harmful side effects for people with gene X, who constitute a small portion of 
the population. She believes there is roughly a 10% chance that the drug will be harmful 
to these people. If she releases the drug in awareness of this risk, she would be reckless. 
Karen knows she could conduct an additional lengthy and expensive study to determine 																																																								
75 See Hellman, supra note 13 at 312. 
76 Id. at 313. 
77 Id. (emphasis added). 
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whether the drug really will be harmful to those with gene X or not. But this would delay 
the release of the drug, thereby preventing the cure from reaching many early-stage 
Alzheimer’s patients in time to cure them. In light of what she sees (based on her 
evidence) as the small risk that the drug will harm those with gene X, she decides not to 
conduct the study and goes ahead and releases the drug. However, suppose that her 
decision not to investigate the risk further in fact is unjustified—though just barely. In 
fact, the all things considered better decision would have been to conduct the study.  
 
Karen is willfully ignorant and her decision to remain in ignorance is unjustified, but only very 
slightly. Hers is a case of nearly justified willful ignorance. I submit that Karen intuitively is less 
culpable than the analogous knowing wrongdoer—i.e. a product manager who knows that the 
drug will be harmful to those with gene X, but releases it anyway. Thus, the mere fact that one’s 
decision not to further investigate the risks of the drug is on balance unjustified given one’s 
evidence does not guarantee that one will be as culpable as the analogous knowing wrongdoer. 
Intuitively, Karen’s nearly justified willful ignorance does not suffice to make her as culpable as 
the analogous knowing product manager. Hence, RECT3 is false.78 
In addition, one might also take issue with the objectivist flavor of Hellman’s view. She is 
explicit that what matters to culpability, on her view, is whether there exists a justification for 
remaining ignorant of the truth, regardless of whether this was actually one’s motivation for 
doing so.79 But others might think that actual motives make all the difference to culpability.  
I can’t resolve this thorny issue here. But even those who are sympathetic to Hellman’s view 
as applied to criminal culpability (as opposed to moral blame) might still worry that her view is 
overly objectivist. Quite plausibly, to get the benefit (for legal purposes) of a justifying reason 
that supports the decision to remain in ignorance, one must at the very least be aware of the facts 
																																																								
78 To be fair, Hellman might be read as aiming only to lay out the conditions under which willful ignorance is 
culpable at all—not to specify when willful ignorance followed by a subsequent reckless actus reus is as culpable as 
the analogous knowing misconduct, which is my focus here. Thus, it seems Hellman plausibly has identified a 
necessary condition for the equal culpability thesis to be true—namely, that one’s decision to remain in ignorance is 
not justified—but it is not a sufficient condition.  
79 Hellman, supra note 13 at 310-12. 
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constituting this reason.80 However, for all Hellman says, it remains possible that one could get 
the benefit of justifying circumstances that objectively exist even if one is not aware of them. 
Her own presentation of her view is at least ambiguous on this point. As she puts it, “[a]n actor is 
culpably blind if his blindness is unjustified. Blindness is justified when the reasons to remain 
ignorant outweigh the reasons to investigate, all things considered. (…) If there are no good 
reasons for [remaining ignorant], this blindness is culpable.”81 Thus, for all Hellman says, it is 
possible that as long as the actor is in circumstances (e.g. occupies the right kind of professional 
role) that would objectively justify the decision to remain in ignorance, the actor would get the 
benefit of this justification even if she is unaware of the facts or circumstances that these 
justifying reasons exist in virtue of.  
Recall Karen. She is in circumstances that provide some, but not a full justification for 
deciding not to do the additional study. She is a bit culpable for her decision to remain in 
ignorance, but not very. Now compare Lauren, who is just like Karen, except that she is entirely 
unaware of the burdens that the study would entail for the patients who would go untreated 
because of the delay in releasing the drug. This thought does not even cross Lauren’s mind. 
Instead, the only consideration she is aware of that she might claim in support of not doing the 
study is that it would involve a lot more work for her. Accordingly, Lauren seems more culpable 
for deciding to remain in ignorance than Karen does. However, on the strongly objectivist 
interpretation of Hellman’s view, Karen and Lauren would both have the same level of 
culpability, since they both actually are in the same circumstances. 
But this is implausible. Hellman’s own presentation of her view does not clearly rule out this 																																																								
80 Alexander and Ferzan endorse this view as well. Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 16 at 60-61. I also defend such a 
view. See Sarch, supra note 18. 
81 Hellman, supra note 13 at 315 (emphasis added). See also id. at 313 (“we ought…to ask whether there are good 
reasons for the actor to choose blindness rather than focus on what reasons actually motivated the actor in choosing 
blindness“). 
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possibility, but it should. At the very least, we should take it that one is culpable to the extent that 
one’s decision to remain in ignorance is unjustified on the facts as one believes them to be. This 
would let us say that Lauren is more culpable than Karen. Lauren, after all, is aware of fewer 
considerations that help justify her ignorance than Karen is aware of. 
To avoid these problems for RECT3, the equal culpability thesis needs to be further refined. 
It should be restricted to cases where the decision to remain in ignorance really is sufficiently 
culpable to get the willfully ignorant actor up to the culpability level of her knowing counterpart. 
Moreover, it should avoid the strongly objectivist interpretation of Hellman’s position. 
 
5. Restricting the Equal Culpability Thesis: The Duty of Reasonable Investigation 
In this Section, I defend a different version of the equal culpability thesis, which draws on 
and deepens the account of willful ignorance I’ve offered elsewhere.82 We saw that the UECT 
failed because sometimes the willfully ignorant actor’s decision not to investigate can be at least 
partially justified. This can prevent the decision to remain in ignorance from providing enough 
added culpability to get one up from a sub-knowledge culpability level to the level of a knowing 
wrongdoer. My account is premised on the thought that sometimes the decision not to investigate 
can fill this gap. I claim that willful ignorance involves the breach of a duty of reasonable 
investigation, and willfully ignorant conduct is as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct 
when this duty is breached in sufficiently serious ways. Thus, I aim to defend: 
Restricted Equal Culpability Thesis 4 (“RECT4”): Suppose A1 and A2 each 
perform the actus reus of a crime requiring knowledge of an inculpatory 
proposition, p. A1 and A2, and their respective actions, are identical in every 
respect except for one: while A1’s action is performed with knowledge of p, A2’s 
action is performed with a form of willful ignorance toward p that involves a 
sufficiently culpable breach of the duty of investigation. On these suppositions, 
A2 is (at least) as culpable for her action as A1 is for his. 
 																																																								
82 See Sarch, supra note 14. 
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Defending RECT4 requires three main claims: 1) there is a duty of investigation, 2) breaching it 
makes one’s conduct more culpable than if no investigations had been feasible, and 3) this added 
culpability can sometimes suffice to make one’s conduct as culpable as the analogous knowing 
misconduct. I will argue for each in turn. 
RECT4 is supposed to be an improvement over Hellman’s account not only because it avoids 
the problems outlined above, but also because it will be supplemented by an account of the 
culpability of breaching the duty to investigate. RECT4, by itself, does not say much. It just 
abstractly describes the conditions in which willfully ignorant misconduct is as culpable as the 
analogous knowing misconduct. However, by explaining why it is culpable to breach the duty to 
investigate and what factors determine how culpable such a breach is, we can home in on the 
conditions in which the equal culpability thesis holds.83 
5.1 There is a duty of reasonable investigation 
The first order of business is to explain the duty to investigate. Nomy Arpaly and Tim 
Schroeder have recently argued that it is implausible to think that there is a duty to “become 
informed about morally important matters, to double check our morally relevant beliefs and do 
our best to make sure that they are true.”84 Their primary concern is that “we cannot in general 
know which of our beliefs need checking.”85 After all, “it is not the case that [we are] under a 
moral obligation to scrutinize all of [our] beliefs regarding” morally important matters.86 
																																																								
83 Note one limitation of my account, which has been implicit in the discussion thus far. I only aim to explain what 
makes defendants with a sub-knowledge level of confidence in the inculpatory proposition, p, as culpable as a 
knowing wrongdoer. Some have suggested that one can be willfully ignorant despite knowing p. See Husak and 
Callender, supra note 8 at 48. I am skeptical of this view, however, because if one has enough certainty in the 
inculpatory proposition to count as knowing it, then it seems implausible to describe one as ignorant of that 
proposition. Moreover, someone who actually knows p can be straightforwardly convicted of the knowledge crime 
in question (provided the evidence suffices). Indeed, it is only when one has a sub-knowledge level of certainty in p 
that any puzzle arises about how one can be as culpable as a knowing wrongdoer. This is the puzzle I aim to answer. 
84 NOMY ARPALY & TIM SCHROEDER, IN PRAISE OF DESIRE 237 (2014). 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
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I think Arpaly and Schroeder’s worry is correct, as far as it goes. But my account avoids the 
concern because the duty of investigation I postulate is limited to a very specific context, which 
is especially morally loaded. My claim is only that the awareness that one’s intended conduct 
would create a risk of harm or illegality gives rise to a duty to investigate in reasonable ways. I 
do not claim that all morally important beliefs require “checking.” Rather, only one specific kind 
triggers the need to investigate: namely, the belief that some action one plans to perform would 
pose substantial risks to the interests of others (e.g. by causing harm or otherwise being illegal).87 
When one possesses such a belief, one’s primary duty is of course to refrain from performing 
the risky action in question. However, on my view, this is not the only duty one incurs. The 
primary duty not to act in certain ways can give rise to secondary duties—as happens when 
breaking a promise or wrongfully injuring someone creates a duty to apologize or offer 
compensation.88 In addition to secondary duties that arise after the breach of a primary duty, 
there are also secondary duties that arise before such a breach, as would be the case if one is 
planning to break a promise and there are preemptive steps one should take to mitigate the 
																																																								
87 Others have discussed similar duties to investigate, but none have systematically developed the precise duty I 
defend here. Holly Smith mentions the case of a driver who “should have checked his mirror earlier, but given that 
he did not, he should check it now rather than back down the driveway.”  Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 
PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 543, 546 (1983). See also GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW? RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT 
AWARENESS 111-12 (2009) (discussing the idea that one’s moral obligations can give rise to secondary epistemic 
duties to be or become aware of morally relevant features of one’s situation); William K. Clifford, The Ethics of 
Belief, in THE ETHICS OF BELIEF AND OTHER ESSAYS, 70–96 (T. Madigan ed., 1999) (famously defending—in 
1877—a broad and weighty moral “duty of inquiry”). 
Tadros also posits a duty to investigate, and like me, he thinks the duty can be reduced in stringency where 
investigating is dangerous or difficult. Tadros, supra note 16 at 246-47. However, Tadros’s duty to investigate is 
much broader than mine, covering not only actors who actually have suspicions of the risk to be investigated but 
also actors who do not. Thus, his duty to investigate also covers some instances of negligent unawareness of the risk 
(or what U.K. courts call objective recklessness). By contrast, my duty to investigate applies only where one already 
has some suspicions or awareness of the risk (i.e. is subjectively reckless). Thus, my account focuses on the failures 
of inquiry that plausibly can provide a basis for treating one as a knowing wrongdoer. (See also infra note 104.) 
88 See, e.g. Gregory Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY 293, 309 (2012) (observing 
that “[r]emedial responsibilities arise out of the breach of antecedent primary duties” and criticizing the corrective 
justice theory of tort for not capturing the priority of primary duties over the secondary duties they generate); John 
Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 33-35 (2011). 
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inconvenience it will cause the promisee. The duty to reasonably investigate likewise is a 
secondary duty that arises in anticipation of subsequent wrongdoing. 
More specifically, this duty arises under conditions like the following. Suppose one is aware 
that some future action one could perform would pose a substantial and unjustified risk of harm 
to interests that are legitimately protected by the law, as would be the case whenever one has 
suspicions about the inculpatory proposition of a crime and there is no justification or excuse. 
Moreover, suppose one plans or intends to perform the act in question.89  In such a case, I 
submit, one would have a secondary duty, deriving from one’s primary duty not to perform the 
underlying action, to make reasonable investigations before performing the underlying action90 
(provided one remains intent on doing it).91  Thus, the conditional duty I postulate is this:  
Duty of Reasonable Investigation (DRI): If i) one is intending or planning92 to 
perform the actus reus of a crime, ii) one possesses substantial confidence (short 
of knowledge) that the associated inculpatory proposition, p, is true (but lacks 
reason to think the risk of p’s truth is somehow justified), and iii) one believes or 
reasonably should believe that there are available ways to investigate whether p 
that are not unduly burdensome, then one has a pro tanto obligation, conditional 
on continuing to hold the relevant intention, to (at least try to) acquire more 
information, in reasonably available ways (if any), about whether p is true or false 
before performing the actus reus. 
 																																																								
89 One might think that the duty to investigate arises not just when one intends or plans to perform the underlying 
risky action, but even when one merely seriously considers whether to perform it. I leave that question open here.  
90 More precisely, there is such a duty here only assuming the law is just. The duty to reasonably investigate, to be 
normatively defensible, ideally should not be triggered if the criminal statute in question is substantively unjust. Of 
course, the law often is unjust. Thus, the law might impose what amounts to a duty of investigation in conditions 
when, normatively speaking, it should not. (Perhaps this is the case with certain harsh drug laws in the U.S., for 
example.) Does this mean courts must evaluate whether the law is just before applying the willful ignorance 
doctrine? (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this worry.) The answer is no. Courts themselves should not have 
to make such a determination. Given their role, their main task is to apply the law as given. However, my question 
as a theorist is different from the court’s. Since I’m concerned with normative culpability (i.e. the amount of 
culpability that the law should attribute), all I am claiming is that there should (from the theorist’s point of view) be 
a legal duty to investigate only where the law actually is just (again, as evaluated from the theorist’s point of view). 
91 It’s conceivable that the investigations one has a duty to perform are not just external investigations aimed at 
collecting more information. I want to leave open the possibility that the required investigations merely involve 
further processing or reflection on information one already has. For example, one might see several red flags, but 
then consciously decide not to think about the matter any further to prevent oneself from putting the pieces together 
and becoming certain that one’s planned conduct would cause harm. Perhaps this could count as willful ignorance.  
92 The term “planning” is included here because it may well be possible that some lesser degree of commitment, 
short of an irrevocable intention to do the underlying act, also triggers the duty to investigate. 
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Thus, suppose Brad plans to set fire to a building despite being aware of a substantial chance that 
someone is inside. When Brad has settled on this less-than-ideal course of action, DRI says he 
has a conditional duty to stop and investigate in reasonably feasible ways before proceeding—for 
example, by looking inside the building. The duty is conditional in the sense that if Brad were to 
abandon his plan, his corresponding duty of investigation would evaporate.93  94 Moreover, his 
duty to investigate is pro tanto in the sense that it can in principle be outweighed by other 
considerations, e.g. if complying with the duty of investigation would make it too hard to comply 
with the primary duty not to do the actus reus, or if investigating otherwise proved to be overly 
harmful or costly. Furthermore, the duty to investigate of course covers not only actively 
acquiring new information (where appropriate), but also not blocking information one would 
have received otherwise. After all, the duty to investigate whether p entails that one should not 
act in ways that prevent one from learning whether p. One minimal form of investigation is 
refraining from taking steps to block oneself from learning the truth. 
One might wonder how one’s beliefs about whether one can reasonably investigate impact 
one’s pro tanto obligation to do so.95 While the argument of this paper doesn’t depend on it, I 
incline toward the following view (and have formulated DRI accordingly). First, if one actually 
can feasibly investigate, although one does not know it (and wouldn’t be expected to know it 																																																								
93 One might worry that this gives Brad an easy way to sidestep his duty to investigate: perhaps he could simply 
withdraw his intention to burn down the building until the very last moment, and thereby avoid incurring any 
secondary duty to investigate before starting the fire.  However, on closer inspection, such a strategy would never 
succeed. Were Brad to adopt such a scheme, he would not genuinely be abandoning his plan or intention to burn 
down the building. Instead, he would merely be executing an elaborate plan to burn it down that involves a generous 
helping of self-deception. Accordingly, the intention that triggers the duty to investigate would remain in place. 
94 Because the duty of investigation is triggered only when the defendant believes the act he is planning would pose 
a substantial and unjustified risk of harm or illegality (or an unjustified risk that the inculpatory proposition is true), 
DRI can accommodate cases where exigent circumstances prevent the need to investigate from arising at all. 
Suppose Laura knows the building must be burnt down to halt a fire that is rapidly spreading towards town, but she 
realizes that there is little time to check if someone is inside. It is not impossible to do so, but it would leave less 
time for other important precautions (e.g. warning the town authorities). One might think the best way to describe 
this situation is not to say that Laura would be justified in breaching the duty of investigation, but rather that such a 
duty does not arise at all. It is to leave room for this possibility that DRI says that the duty to investigate arises only 
if the substantial risk one is aware of is unjustified. 
95 Thanks to Kimberly Ferzan for pressing me on this issue. 
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given one’s evidence), then DRI is not triggered.96 By contrast, if one (reasonably) believes one 
can feasibly investigate, but one is mistaken, then I take it one has a pro tanto obligation at least 
to attempt to investigate. After all, it arguably shows some lack of regard for others, and thus 
some culpability, to fail to even try to investigate in ways that plausibly seem available.97  
Note finally that in complying with DRI, what one learns about the inculpatory proposition 
can impact the stringency of one’s primary duty not to do the actus reus. Recall Brad. If he 
investigates as required, there are three possibilities. First, he might learn that there is a greater 
chance than expected that someone is in the building. This would strengthen his primary duty not 
to set it on fire. He would display more culpability were he to start the fire with this increased 
certainty that someone is inside (a consequence of CCP). Second, he might learn that there is a 
smaller chance than expected that someone is inside. If so, his duty not to start the fire would be 
weakened (though it would persist due to the independent reasons not to set even unoccupied 
buildings on fire). Third, the strength of his duty not to start the fire would remain unchanged if 
investigating did not alter his estimate of the likelihood that someone is in the building.  
5.2 Why one’s culpability is affected by whether one breaches DRI 
To explain why acting in willful ignorance is more culpable than purely reckless action—and 
indeed sometimes is as culpable as acting knowingly—I argue that breaching DRI can itself be 
an independent source of culpability. The key claim to be shown is that failing to investigate as 
DRI requires and then performing the underlying risky action is more culpable (provided one has 
no relevant excuse or justification) than it would be to perform the same risky action when 																																																								
96 What about the case where one actually does not know one can investigate, but even if one did, one wouldn’t do 
it? DRI entails that if one reasonably should be aware of available investigative steps, one has a pro tanto obligation 
to use them. But I take it that the counterfactual truth that one would not investigate even if one knew one could 
doesn’t directly bear on one’s culpability—for the same reasons I rejected the counterfactual test in RECT2. 
97 One might doubt that this is true in the event that one only unreasonably believes one can investigate. This is a 
difficult issue that I do not have room to fully settle here. I have formulated DRI so that one’s pro tanto obligation to 
investigate is triggered even by the unreasonable belief that there are feasible ways to do so, but I acknowledge that 
this might be controversial. My main argument in any case doesn’t depend on it. 
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investigating is not an option (in which case DRI is not breached and the actus reus would be 
done merely recklessly). More precisely:  
Added Culpability Thesis: For any person, A, to whom DRI applies, if A breaches 
DRI and proceeds to perform the underlying actus reus that DRI required A to 
investigate the risks of, then in virtue of this breach, A is at least a little bit more 
culpable for his conduct (provided he has no justification or excuse) than a similarly 
situated person, B, who performs the same actus reus but had no reasonable way to 
investigate the risks of that action, would be for her conduct. 
 
I take this claim to be intuitive, but let me also offer an argument for it. Having done so, I then 
give a more general account of how complying with or breaching DRI impacts culpability. 
The argument for the Added Culpability Thesis is that—from the actor’s perspective—doing 
the underlying risky action having breached the duty to investigate involves two missed chances 
to assure oneself that one’s conduct will not be wrongful, while doing the risky action when 
investigating is not an option involves only one. Suppose I intend to do an action at t1 that I am 
aware will be risky. Moreover, I realize I can feasibly investigate at an earlier time, t0, whether 
this risk really will materialize after I act at t1. My first chance to assure myself that my intended 
conduct will not be wrongful comes at t0. As things seem to me then, if I investigate, I might 
learn that the risk in question will not materialize. But if I fail to investigate, while keeping my 
intention to do the risky action (and I have no justification or excuse), I manifest a lack of due 
regard for others that contributes to my culpability. However, my overall culpability level is not 
yet fixed at t0 because I have a second chance to assure myself that my intended conduct will not 
be wrongful—i.e. during the period up to t1. After all, until t1, I can simply abandon my 
intention to perform the risky action at t1. Going ahead with that action is another manifestation 
of insufficient regard for others. Thus, breaching DRI and carrying out the risky action involves 
two missed chances (one epistemic and the other practical) to rule out the possibility that conduct 
that I intend is wrongful. By contrast, when I have no feasible way to investigate, performing the 
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underlying risky action only involves one such missed opportunity, and thus only one 
manifestation of insufficient regard. Accordingly, breaching DRI and doing the risky action is 
more culpable than doing that action when investigating is not an option—just as the Added 
Culpability Thesis says. 
One might think there is something odd about my claim that breaching DRI is an 
independent source of culpability. Arpaly and Schroeder, for instance, object to the idea of such 
a duty on the ground that complying with it would “not absolve one of moral blame.”98 After all, 
even if one investigates as DRI requires, one might still proceed to behave culpably. If one learns 
that the inculpatory proposition is true, but performs the actus reus anyway, then one would be a 
knowing wrongdoer and display a correspondingly high level of culpability. Thus, even if one 
complies with DRI, one might display more on-balance culpability than others who fail to 
investigate as DRI requires—e.g. those who don’t investigate but then have a change of heart 
and do not do the actus reus. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that someone who breaches DRI 
will be on-balance more culpable than someone who complies with it. In what sense, then, can 
failing to investigate be independently culpable?99  
These considerations are in fact consistent with my account. I don’t claim that investigating 
as DRI requires fully absolves one of blame. Nor do I claim that it always renders one on-
balance less culpable than someone who breaches DRI. Rather, I contend only that, in virtue of 
breaching DRI, there is one respect in which one is more culpable than someone who complies 
with DRI. This leaves open the possibility someone who investigates might still be on-balance 
more culpable than someone who does not. Thus, my basic claim about the relative culpability of 
breaching versus complying with DRI is this: 																																																								
98 Supra, note 84 at 238. 
99 A related worry is discussed below. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.  
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Culpability for Breach vs. Compliance (“CBC”): For any two similarly situated 
individuals, X and Y, if X breaches DRI while Y does not breach DRI (either by 
complying with it or its not applying), then (in virtue of X’s breach) there is at least one 
respect in which X is more culpable than Y—even if Y (in virtue of other features of her 
behavior) ultimately is on-balance more culpable than X. 
 
CBC is compatible with cases where complying with DRI seems on-balance more culpable than 
breaching it—e.g. if Y investigates and learns that the inculpatory proposition is true but does the 
actus reus anyway, as compared with X who breaches DRI but decides not to do the actus reus 
after all. All CBC says is that there is one respect in which X is more culpable than Y. Moreover, 
the Added Culpability Thesis fits naturally with CBC. The Added Culpability Thesis compares 
the culpability of two similarly situated people, labeled A and B above, who both do the actus 
reus with suspicions about the inculpatory proposition, where A breaches DRI but B cannot 
reasonably investigate (so that DRI does not apply and is not breached). CBC suggests there is 
one respect in which A is more culpable than B. Thus, since all else is equal (i.e. A and B are 
“similarly situated”), A is also on-balance a bit more culpable than B—just as the Added 
Culpability Thesis claims. 
 To further flesh out CBC, we can map out the culpability of complying with or breaching 
DRI as follows. When DRI applies to the actor, there are three main variables: 1) whether the 
actor investigates at t0 as DRI requires; 2) whether the inculpatory proposition, p, is true (such 
that investigating would raise the actor’s credence in p) or false (such that investigating would 
lower her credence in p);100 and 3) whether the actor proceeds to perform the actus reus at t1. 
Given these three variables, there are eight cases in which DRI applies. The following table 
summarizes CBC’s implications about the actor’s culpability in each: 																																																								
100 It is a simplifying assumption of my model that when the inculpatory proposition p is true, investigating would 
lead one to acquire greater certainty that p, while when p is false, investigating would lower one’s certainty that p. 
However, this will not always be accurate. It is possible that p is false, but investigating under the circumstances 
would yield evidence that raises one’s credence in p. However, I set aside this complication here to keep the model 
simple. It can be expanded to capture this additional winkle if needed. 
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Case 1 is the scenario that worried Arpaly and Schroeder. But, as seen, it is consistent with CBC. 
Case 5 is the paradigm case of acting in willful ignorance, and A’s culpability here conforms to 
the Added Culpability Thesis. In Case 6, I take it that A’s culpability is the same as an analogous 
instance of Case 5, but because p is not true in Case 6, A generally will not face criminal 
liability. Suppose Brad intends to light a building on fire while suspecting someone is inside. If 
Brad decides not to investigate, then although he breaches DRI, he would not be convicted of the 
higher grade of arson that requires knowing a person is in the building (only a lower grade of 
arson). After all, the inculpatory proposition for the higher grade, someone is in the building, 
actually is false. Thus, Brad benefits from a sort of moral luck that is prevalent in existing 
criminal law.101 Finally, in Cases 7 and 8, CBC entails that A displays at least a little bit of 
insufficient regard in virtue of breaching DRI, even though A in fact ends up avoiding the wrong 																																																								
101 Cf. Alexander and Ferzan, supra note 16 at 171 (noting that under current law, “resulting harm makes an actor” 
subject to greater punishment, but arguing that this is problematic). 
 A investigates at t0; 
does actus reus at 
t1 
A investigates 
at t0; does not 
do actus reus 
at t1 
A does not 
investigate at t0; does 
actus reus at t1 (= 
willful ignorance) 
A does not investigate 
at t0; does not do actus 
reus at t1 
P is true; A 
would learn 
upon 
investigating 
that P is 
more likely 
than initially 
believed  
Case 1: A manifests 
no insufficient 
regard at t0, but 
manifests extreme 
insufficient regard at 
t1 (as much as a 
knowing actor). 
Case 3: A 
manifests no 
insufficient 
regard at t0 or 
at t1. 
Case 5: A manifests 
some insufficient 
regard at t0, and 
manifests substantial 
insufficient regard at 
t1. A’s total culpability 
is the sum of the 
culpability displayed 
at t0 and at t1. 
Case 7: A manifests 
some insufficient regard 
at t0, but manifests no 
insufficient regard at t1. 
A’s total culpability 
level likely is far less 
than the amount needed 
to be criminally liable.  
P is false; A 
would learn 
upon 
investigating 
that P is less 
likely than 
initially 
believed 
Case 2: A manifests 
no insufficient 
regard at t0, and 
manifests less 
insufficient regard at 
t1 than if her initial 
credence in P had 
not been lowered. 
Case 4: A 
manifests no 
insufficient 
regard at t0 or 
at t1. 
Case 6: Same as case 
5, except that A will 
not face criminal 
liability because P is 
false. (A is as culpable 
as in Case 5, but gets 
lucky since P is false.) 
Case 8: Same as case 7.  
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in doing the actus reus. One might quibble with this result on the ground that if A does not do the 
actus reus, then since there is “no harm,” there can be “no foul” (i.e. no culpability). Nonetheless, 
I think it’s plausible in this case that breaching DRI can itself be a manifestation of insufficient 
regard, even if one ultimately declines to do the actus reus. However, this is of little practical 
concern, since whatever small amount of culpability A incurs by breaching DRI likely will be far 
below the amount that is plausibly required to make criminal liability warranted. 
I do not have space to fully defend all the claims in this table. But doing so isn’t necessary to 
vindicate the basic claim I need for my argument to go through—namely, that breaching DRI is 
an independent source of culpability beyond what one displays in virtue of doing the actus reus 
purely recklessly (i.e. when investigating is not feasible). Still, showing how complying with vs. 
breaching DRI systematically impacts culpability lends plausibility to the idea that DRI is a 
genuine and theoretically well-behaved pro tanto duty. 
5.3 How much culpability does breaching DRI entail?  
Suppose I’m right that breaching DRI entails that there is at least one respect in which one is 
more culpable than if one had not breached it (either because one complied with it or because it 
did not apply at all). One might then wonder how much additional culpability breaching DRI 
confers. I cannot fully answer this question, but let me mention several central factors. First, the 
amount of culpability it entails would be affected by the difficulty of acquiring more information 
about one’s suspicions compared to not doing so. Specifically, the added culpability acquired 
from breaching DRI seems greater a) the easier it is to seek out relevant information, and b) the 
harder it would be to avoid additional information that one otherwise naturally would have 
received. Regarding a), if it requires little effort to find out whether one, say, is transporting 
drugs, then failing to investigate appears more culpable than if there are significant burdens in 
investigating (e.g. if it may get one shot). Regarding b), taking active steps to block oneself from 
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learning facts that one otherwise naturally would have learned (e.g. if one takes a detour on the 
way to work to avoid seeing something one suspects one might) can be an especially egregious 
investigative failure. It would show that one not only is unwilling to bear the costs of seeking out 
more information, but that one also is willing to bear costs to avoid information that otherwise 
was coming one’s way in the normal course of events.102 
Second, DRI can be breached with different mens rea. Being willfully ignorant requires 
deliberately failing to investigate (i.e. consciously choosing to preserve one’s ignorance). But 
one could also inadvertently breach DRI if one, say, forgets to investigate or is distracted from 
doing so. In that case, one would not be as culpable for the breach as if one consciously decided 
to preserve one’s ignorance. Similarly, if one breaches DRI because one fails to realize that some 
method of investigation exists or that one should investigate (both forms of negligence), one 
would seem less culpable than if one failed to investigate while knowing that it’s possible to 
investigate and that one should—as required for true willfulness. Thus, the breaches of DRI in 
willful ignorance will be more culpable, all else equal, than merely negligent breaches thereof. 
Third, when one breaches DRI by consciously deciding to remain in ignorance (as required 
for truly willful ignorance), the decision can be supported by the justifying circumstances one is 
aware of. If one is aware of no circumstances that help justify the decision not to investigate (e.g. 
if one has no reason to believe that investigating would be dangerous or costly to others), then all 
else equal the decision not to investigate as DRI requires will be more culpable. After all, it 
would manifest more disregard for the protected interests of others. By contrast, if one is aware 
of serious downsides to investigating—e.g. if it risks injury to oneself or others, or conflicts with 
one’s professional or familial obligations—then this can help justify the decision to remain in 																																																								
102 This might help explain why some courts require that the defendant take affirmative steps to avoid knowledge in 
order for a willful ignorance jury instruction to be appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 
1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990). It would be another way to home in on especially egregious cases of willful ignorance. 
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ignorance. It would, all else equal, make one less culpable for the decision to remain in 
ignorance rather than investigate as DRI requires. It would make this decision manifest less 
disregard for the protected interests of others. 
Finally, while one’s culpability for breaching DRI plausibly is greater the more serious the 
harm or illegality is that will be risked by the subsequent action one intends, note that this factor 
is not crucial for present purposes. After all, the truth of the equal culpability thesis depends only 
on whether the willfully ignorant defendant is as culpable as a similarly situated knowing 
wrongdoer—i.e. where the harm or illegality in question is the same in both cases.103 Thus, the 
seriousness of the risk that DRI requires one to investigate is not crucial for the present project of 
determining the proper scope of the equal culpability thesis.  
5.4 Willfully ignorant conduct can be as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct 
How does all this support RECT4? If the Added Culpability Thesis is correct, it’s easy to see 
how acting in willful ignorance can be at least as culpable as doing the same conduct knowingly. 
My account was supposed to explain how the decision to remain in ignorance can raise one’s 
culpability up from the level of a purely reckless actor (where investigating is not feasible), CR, 
to the level of the analogous knowing actor, CK. Since willful ignorance always involves a 
breach of DRI, and since breaching DRI—according to the Added Culpability Thesis—makes 
one more culpable than if investigating were not feasible, acting in willful ignorance will at least 
sometimes be as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct. In particular, when the extra 
culpability that the willfully ignorant actor incurs form his conscious decision to breach DRI is 
greater than or equal to CK–CR, then doing the actus reus of the crime in willful ignorance will 
																																																								
103 See Alex Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 121-22 & n.79 (2016) (discussing different 
ways the equal culpability thesis could be understood). 
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be at least culpable as doing this conduct with knowledge. If the equal culpability thesis is 
restricted to this subset of cases—as is RECT4—we can be sure that it holds.104 
Of course, RECT4 is non-vacuously true only if there are some cases of the sort just 
identified. But given the wide range of actors in the real world, we can be confident that there are 
some. The easiest way to see this is to note that some defendants will have a degree of belief in p 
that is just short of knowledge. In such cases, CR will be quite high, so it won’t take much extra 
culpability to get the actor up from CR to CK. Since some breaches of DRI are more culpable than 
others, we can be quite sure that sometimes a deliberate breach of DRI will entail enough extra 
culpability to fill this gap. 
 
6.  Objections  
Let me close by addressing some objections. First, one might object that DRI does not fit 
with standard accounts of conditional obligation.105 This account holds, roughly, that A has an 
obligation to ϕ conditional on C iff all of the best possible worlds, according to the relevant 
standard of evaluation, where C is true are also ones in which A does ϕ.106 However, this seems 
not to hold for DRI. Some worlds in which the antecedent conditions of DRI are met and A fails 
to investigate still might be better with respect to culpability than some worlds in which the 
																																																								
104 This highlights how my account of willful ignorance is importantly different from Tadros’s, although it also 
relies on a duty to investigate. Cf. Tadros, supra note 16 at 246-47, 258-61. My account, premised on the narrow 
investigative duty DRI, is designed to answer a specific puzzle about how it can be that some reckless actors (who 
are aware of a risk that the inculpatory proposition is true) can nonetheless be treated as if they possessed 
knowledge. Thus, my account singles out a particularly egregious kind of (subjective) recklessness that can 
substitute for knowledge—as is needed to vindicate the willful ignorance doctrine. By contrast, Tadros is interested 
in whether willful blindness ever “manifests the degree and kind of vice for which the attribution of criminal 
responsibility is appropriate,” and he argues that it can. Id. at 258. I don’t take issue with this claim. But Tadros is 
not concerned, as I am, to home in on the worst cases of willful ignorance, which surpass mere recklessness and are 
as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct. His account seeks to distinguish cases that are not appropriate for 
punishment at all from those that are. My account, on the other hand, focuses on cases that are already within the 
proper scope of criminal liability and defends a claim about precisely how culpable they are. 
105 Thanks to Jake Ross for this objection. 
106 See, e.g., Frank Jackson, On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation, 94 MIND 177 (1985) (discussing the 
“standard approach” to the semantics of ought claims, and conditional ought claims in particular). 
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antecedent of DRI is met but A does investigate. For example, suppose A breaches DRI by not 
investigating, but then decides not to perform the actus reus of the crime. This scenario seems 
better than the one where A complies with DRI, learns that the inculpatory proposition is true, 
but then goes ahead and does the actus reus with full knowledge. 
This objection admits of two answers (beyond rejecting the standard account of conditional 
obligation, as some have suggested107). First, one might back off the claim that there is a 
conditional duty to investigate, and instead say only that one has a weighty reason to investigate 
in virtue of intending the actus reus108 (though one might wonder exactly how reasons bear on 
culpability). The second response, which I prefer, is to recall that breaching the pro tanto 
obligation specified in DRI entails only that there is one respect in which one is more culpable 
than if one had complied with DRI. This allows that a person who fails to investigate still might 
be on-balance less culpable than someone who does investigate. This line of response also 
amounts to claiming that the standard analysis of conditional obligation does not apply to DRI. 
Specifically, the standard analysis of conditional obligation would at best apply only to claims 
about on-balance culpability, not pro tanto contributors to culpability (i.e. claims that acting in 
this way or that just reveals one respect in which one is more culpable). This is why CBC was 
formulated as it is in terms of contributors to culpability, not on-balance culpability. But it is also 
worth bearing in mind that all I need to secure RECT4 is the Added Culpability Thesis. Thus, 
even if the details of CBC require refinement, I can still succeed in my main aim. 
A second objection concerns the overall structure of my account. Specifically, one might 
wonder why it is legitimate to add the culpability incurred from breaching DRI to that incurred 
from recklessly performing the actus reus. If these two quantities of culpability can be added 
																																																								
107 Others have raised related worries for the standard view of conditional ought claims. See Jackson, id. at 179-80. 
108 Thanks to Gideon Yaffe for this response. 
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together, why can’t the reckless actor’s culpability be supplemented by the culpability of other 
bits of misconduct she might perform (say, cheating on her taxes)?109 
The answer is apparent when we recall that the notion of culpability that matters to the 
criminal law is one’s culpability for a given course of action—not how defective one’s character 
is in general. 110  I’ve claimed that cases of willful ignorance decompose into two main 
components: i) breaching DRI and ii) performing the actus reus with suspicions of the 
inculpatory proposition (i.e. recklessly). These two components are tightly connected in that i) is 
an integral part of the deliberative process that gives rise to ii), and this is the reason the 
culpability inherent in i) is legitimately taken to augment that which ii) independently possesses. 
After all, i) and ii) form two parts of the same course of action. Part of the motivational process 
that issues in the willfully ignorant defendant’s doing the actus reus is the information and 
apparent reasons he possessed while deliberating about how to act. What information he 
deliberates from, in turn, is a function of his failure to further investigate the attendant risks of 
the actus reus (i.e. whether the inculpatory proposition is true). Thus, the failure to investigate is 
a central part of the genesis of the willfully ignorant actor’s performance of the actus reus and is 
legitimately considered together with it. Of course, there will be line drawing problems about 
where to say the process that generates some bit of behavior begins. But in general, the 
motivational and deliberative process that issues in a course of conduct is a proper basis for 
deciding how culpable that conduct is—as is clear from the fact that we decide, say, whether a 
homicide constitutes first-degree murder by asking whether it was premeditated. Accordingly, 
																																																								
109 Thanks to Jake Ross, Steven Schaus and Gideon Yaffe for pressing me on this point. 
110 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
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one’s culpability for failing to investigate can fairly be added to one’s culpability for doing the 
actus reus recklessly. (In other work, I offer a more general reply to this sort of worry.111) 112 
 
7.  Conclusion 
My aim in this paper has been to home in on the conditions in which the equal culpability 
thesis holds. The importance of this task lies in the courts’ “traditional rationale” for giving 
willful ignorance jury instructions. To remain faithful to this rationale, such instructions should 
be given only when the trial evidence plausibly shows that the defendant acted with a form of 
willful ignorance that rendered his conduct at least as culpable as the analogous knowing 
misconduct.113 Without an account of the conditions under which willfully ignorant misconduct 
is as culpable as knowing misconduct, then unfairness threatens—either by giving willful 
ignorance instructions when they are unwarranted or by arbitrarily stopping short of giving them 
in the full range of cases in which they are warranted. 
I have argued that several common versions of the equal culpability thesis are false. Section 1 
argued that the unrestricted equal culpability thesis is not true: sometimes willfully ignorant 
																																																								
111 Alex Sarch, The Moral and Legal Contours of Culpable Ignorance, ch. 6 (manuscript on file with author) 
(defending a general theory of mens rea substitution that builds in a relatedness constraint of this sort). 
112 Holly Smith has also raised an interesting objection to duties to inform oneself, at least insofar as they are 
“subjective duties”—i.e. ones that arise in virtue of what one believes. See Holly Smith, The Subjective Moral Duty 
to Inform Oneself before Acting, 125 ETHICS 11, 23-31 (2014). She argues that it can’t be the case that the sole 
reason we subjectively ought to investigate is that it would enable us to subsequently do the action that has the most 
“deontic value.” After all, even though keeping a weightier promise has more deontic value than keeping a less 
weighty promise, it doesn’t follow that one has an obligation to go around making more weighty promises. 
Likewise, one doesn’t have a duty to go around investigating things just so that one will be able to do actions with 
more deontic value. I think Smith is right that there has to be more to it than that.  
However, my view avoids Smith’s objection. The trouble with the investigative duty she considers is that it 
takes the duty to investigate to be purely derivative of the deontic values of the subsequent acts that investigating, or 
not, would enable one to perform. However, as we saw, my view makes the duty to investigate non-derivative in 
Smith’s sense. That is, I argued that there is an independently existing reason to inform oneself: namely, that not 
doing so can manifest insufficient regard for the protected interests or rights of others. Thus, on my view, there is 
something in itself good (or at least culpability-avoiding) about informing oneself in reasonable ways. It shows a 
kind of seriousness, conscientiousness and respect towards others. 
113 Such jury instructions generally may be given only if it can reasonably be inferred from the trial evidence that the 
defendant was willfully ignorant. See, e.g., United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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misconduct is not as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct. In Section 2, I argued that it 
is also problematic to restrict the equal culpability thesis to just those cases where the defendant 
remained ignorant to preserve a defense against liability. After that, I considered more plausible 
approaches to restricting the thesis. However, as argued in Section 3, the counterfactual approach 
offered by Michaels and Luban risks punishing merely for character, not for one’s actual 
conduct. Moreover, section 4 argued that Hellman’s approach, while promising, also faced 
difficulties. Finally, in Sections 5 and 6, I defended my own version of the thesis. I suggested 
that willfully ignorant misconduct is at least as culpable as the analogous knowing misconduct 
just in case the defendant breached her duty of reasonable investigation in sufficiently serious 
ways before performing the actus reus.  
If I am right, then willful ignorance jury instructions should only be given when it can 
reasonably be inferred from the trial evidence that the defendant satisfies the conditions picked 
out by my account. Thus, my account provides guidance for deciding whether willful ignorance 
jury instructions are warranted. In particular, the relevant decision-maker should consider two 
sorts of question. First, it should be asked how much confidence the defendant had in the 
inculpatory proposition when acting—and, in particular, how much below the knowledge 
threshold her degree of confidence in that proposition was. The closer she is to the knowledge 
threshold, the less of a culpability gap there is to be filled before she becomes as culpable as a 
similarly situated knowing actor. Second, it should be asked how much additional culpability the 
willfully ignorant defendant incurred by breaching her duty of reasonable investigation. This, in 
turn, depends on several factors. Did the defendant perceive serious costs, dangers or difficulties 
in investigating her suspicions about the inculpatory proposition? How justifiable or unjustifiable 
was the decision to remain in ignorance under the circumstances the defendant was aware of? 
Was she merely trying to set up a defense against liability, perhaps, or was she aware of 
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justifying circumstances that plausibly support not investigating—e.g. dangers from doing so, or 
her professional or familial obligations? 
On my account, the answers to such questions provide the raw material from which to form a 
judgment about whether a given willfully ignorant defendant is as culpable as a similarly situated 
knowing wrongdoer. Granted, the suggested inquiry is multifaceted and simplifications may be 
required in order to apply the account in practice.114 Thus, it may be prudent for courts to adopt 
only some approximation of the approach defended here. Nonetheless, the defense of the equal 
culpability thesis I have offered lays bare the sort of inquiry to be undertaken in deciding 
whether willful ignorance jury instructions are appropriate in particular cases. 
																																																								
114 I discuss some such simplifications elsewhere. See Sarch, supra note 44 at 1094-1101.  
